Discussion paper: Gigerenzer (1991) “How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond "heuristics and biases"”, European Review of Social Psychology
Supplementary papers:
- Gigerenzer (1993) “The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models”, in Rationality: Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives
- Kahneman and Tversky (1996) “On the reality of cognitive illusions”, Psychological Review
- Gigerenzer (1996) “On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky”, Psychological Review
One of the more famous debates in behavioural economics played out in a series of articles between 1991 and 1996.
Gigerenzer, G. (1991). How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond
“heuristics and biases.” European Review of Social Psychology,
2(1), 83–115.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14792779143000033
Gigerenzer, G. (1993). The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models. In K. Manktelow and D. Over (Eds.), Rationality: Psychological and philosophical perspectives (pp. 284–313). Routledge.
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to
Kahneman and
Tversky.
Psychological Review,
103, 592–596.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.592
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions.
Psychological Review,
103(3), 582–591.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.3.582